MCP-SUPPLY-01 — Package Integrity Verification#
Level: L2
Domain: SUPPLY
Requirement#
MCP server deployments SHOULD use dependency lockfiles with cryptographic hashes and SHOULD verify package signatures where available.
Rationale#
Supply chain attacks via malicious packages (typosquatting, compromised maintainer accounts) can inject backdoors or exfiltrate credentials.
Scope#
Package installation and build processes.
Required Evidence#
- Lockfile present:
package-lock.json,poetry.lock,Cargo.lock,go.sum - Hashes verified during install:
npm ci,pip install --require-hashes - Documented process for reviewing dependency updates
Verification Guidance#
Static#
- Presence of lockfile in repository
- CI/CD uses
npm cior equivalent (notnpm install) - Dependabot/Renovate configured with manual review
Dynamic#
- Modify lockfile hash → install should fail
Mappings#
- OWASP Top 10: A06:2021 – Vulnerable and Outdated Components, A08:2021 – Software and Data Integrity Failures
- OWASP MCP Top 10: MCP-06 (Supply Chain & Dependency Tampering)
Exceptions & Compensating Controls#
NOT_APPLICABLE: Fully vendored dependencies with audited source.
References#
- Kaspersky: “Malicious MCP Servers Supply Chain Attack” (Sept 2024)
- Snyk advisory on dependency risks